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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 29/01/2008 Accident number: 484 
Accident time: 11:03 Accident Date: 04/06/2007 
Where it occurred: Bagram, Kabul 
Province 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: Not recorded 
ID original source: None Name of source: UNMACA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: building rubble 
hard 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 29/01/2008 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not made available Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
handtool may have increased injury (?) 
inadequate equipment (?) 
use of pick (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
 
Accident report 
The report of this accident was made available in August 2007 as a PDF file. Its conversion to 
a text file for editing means that some of the formatting has been lost. The substance of the 
report is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. The original PDF file is held on record. The 
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record made available is a “Lessons Learned” document and not the full BoI report. This 
record will be amended if the full report is made available later. Text in [ ] is editorial. 
 
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY 
DEMINING ACCIDENT ON DEMINER OF [International demining NGO] AT BAGRAM 
DATED 04 JUNE 2007 
 
INTRODUCTION:  
1. As a result of a mine accident on 04 June 2007, an investigation team from AMAC Kabul 
comprising  [Name removed] (Quality Management Assistant (QMA)) and [Name 
removed]  (OPS Associate), conducted the investigation in accordance with UNMACA 
Standard Working Procedures. 
2. The accident involved a deminer of [International demining NGO], MU-03, named [the 
Victim]. The deminer received very severe injuries to both eyes resulting in permanent 
blindness and his right arm (above elbow joint) was amputated. 
 
SUMMARY: 
3. On 04 June 2007 at 1103 hrs while the deminer was working in his clearance lane, his 
trowel struck the top of a PMN anti personnel mine, causing the mine to detonate. During 
the accident his visor was not worn. This lack of face protection caused the serious 
injuries to his eyes.  The accident occurred near a corner of a ruined mud wall. The mud 
wall over a period of time had gradually disintegrated and fallen on ground surface, thus 
increasing the ground depth over the mine. The ground depth reached 70 cm at the 
accident point; the deminer had failed to remove this additional soil above original surface 
of the ground. 
4. The distance from the accident point to the hospital where deminer was admitted is 5 km; 
it took 20 minutes to convey the injured deminer.  
 
CONCLUSIONS: 
5. The investigation team concluded that the accident occurred because of the following 
reasons:  
• The deminer failed to remove the extra soil from original surface of the ground and 
then clear to 15 cm depth. 
• The deminer was working directly over centre of the located signal. 
• The deminer was working with appropriate hand tools and was dressed with PPE, but 
his visor was not worn therefore, his face received multiple injuries.  
• Structure of the team: 1 team leader, 1 assistant  team leader and 6 deminers, but 3 
deminers of this team were shifted to [International demining group] DT-42. Team 
leader and assistant team leader failed to control remaining 3 deminers and prevent 
them from practicing incorrect drills. 
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• The lack of some key command and basic strategies were contributing factors to the 
accident, if the basic rules and standard working procedures are adhered to, 
accidents of this nature will be minimised. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS:  
6. The following points are to be considered: 
• When deminers are working on an area on which sediment soils have been 
accumulated, they must firstly remove the accumulated soil from the original ground 
surface and then clear to 15 cm depth. 
• Command group should strictly control the deminers and not permit incorrect drills 
and procedures, ensuring that they are working in accordance with set procedures 
and SOPs.  
• Team is to ensure that the accident site remains secured in its original shape until 
Board of Inquiry is completed. 
• Site supervisors are to inform their relevant offices as soon as possible after the 
accident occurs and then the AMAC office by telephone or CODAN radio to 
investigate the case immediately. 
 
Signed: Chief of Operations, UNMACA Kabul 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 647 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: no 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: 20 minutes 
Protection issued: Short frontal vest 
Long visor 
Protection used: Short frontal vest, 
Visor worn raised 
 
Summary of injuries: 
AMPUTATION/LOSS: Eyes  
Arm Above elbow 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The trowel used by this International demining NGO may have been a short “mattock”, which 
they often call a “trowel” without explanation. Their mattock has featured in many accidents 
because it is difficult to use without considerable force. Its use is fast, but makes initiation 
more likely, especially of mines with pressure plates that extend over the entire top surface of 
the mine (as detailed in the GICHD Manual Demining Study 2005). From records in this 
database it can be seen that the mattock has caused severe injury when the head breaks off 
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and strikes the user. The deminer’s am loss in this accident may be a case in point. An 
example used by this International NGO in another country is shown below.  
 
Alternatively, the tool may have been some kind of builder’s trowel, which is also not a safe 
tool, breaking all of the design requirements for a blast resistant tool and failing to meet the 
recommendations in the IMAS. They are not designed for purpose, not designed to protect 
the user's hand and not designed to stay in one piece in a blast. 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Inadequate equipment” because the 
inappropriate design of tools makes initiation more likely. The fact that this has been known 
for many years but not recognised by the management of the International demining NGO 
involved in this accident is the reason that the secondary cause is listed as a “Management 
control inadequacy”.  The NGO’s failure to ensure that the field supervisors enforced the 
correct wearing of the visor is another management control inadequacy.  
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